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THE UNSEEMLY NATURE OF RESERVATION DIMINISHMENT
BY JUDICIAL, AS OPPOSED TO LEGISLATIVE, FIAT
AND THE IRONIC ROLE OF THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
IN LIMITING BOTH
ROBERT LAURENCE*
"You own the stars?"
"Yes."
"But I have already seen a king who -"
"Kings do not own, they reign over. It is a very different matter."**
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper will explore the distinction being made by the
Businessman to the Little Prince, to wit, the distinction between
ownership of land and sovereign power over it. I will conclude that the
distinction is a crucial one to the continued viability of federal Indian
law, but that it is a distinction losing its force in the field, which bodes ill.
I will first discuss the recent case of Hagen v. Utah,' in which the
Supreme Court returned again, for the sixth time, to the question of
whether an Indian reservation had been diminished in size by a prior
congressional enactment. 2 In deciding that this particular reservation
had been diminished, the Court dealt a blow to the particular tribe
involved, but not very much to Indian law in general. The Court held
that there were certain lands over which the tribe did not have sovereign
power, because the size of the reservation had intentionally been reduced
by Congress years ago.3 The tribe still retained governmental power
over its reservation, but, due to congressional fiat, that reservation was
smaller than it once was. 4 This is a potentially destructive, but, at the
same time, potentially controllable, method of analysis, because it puts
the ultimate decision in Congress, where effective tribal advocates have at
least a chance to limit reservation diminishment.
* Robert A. Leflar Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
** ANTOINE DE SAINT-ExupIiRy, THE LrrnE PRINCE 45 (Katherine Woods, trans. 1943).
1. 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
2. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
3. Id. at 961.
4. Id.
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I will next discuss another recent case, South Dakota v. Bourland,5
in which the Supreme Court continued its inspection of the powers that
Indian tribes have over non-Indians and their property.6 In Bourland,
using analysis not unlike the ipse dixit of the Businessman to the Little
Prince, the Court denied tribal power over land, within the reservation,
but owned by non-Indians. 7 This, I will conclude, is the unfortunate
continuation of the pernicious method of diminishment of Indian
reservations under federal common law, begun in the notorious Oliphant
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.8 Diminishment by judicial, not legislative,
fiat preempts legislative prerogative and makes it much harder for tribal
advocates to guard the remaining vestiges of tribal sovereignty.
Hagen-type diminishment reduces tribal power by re-drawing
reservation boundaries through the interpretation of old congressional
enactments.9 Bourland-type diminishment reduces tribal power by
making land ownership, not reservation boundaries, the key to tribal
power.lO The convergence of these two lines of analysis reduces tribal
governmental power to the bare minimum, and perhaps below. An
entity that has jurisdiction only over its own lands and its own members
is more accurately denominated a "club" than a "government," and I
fear that, unless diverted, this convergence will leave tribal sovereignty a
mere symbol of pre-Columbian days.
Finally, I will offer a solution to this threat, a solution sure to be
controversial. Understanding the irony of my position, I will
nevertheless suggest that the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)11 may, in the
end and to everyone's surprise, be the savior, not the destroyer, of tribal
sovereignty as we have come to know it late in the twentieth century.
The ICRA is disliked by many tribal advocates and has been described
by Professor Robert A. Williams, Jr. as "a highly efficient process of
legal auto-genocide, the ultimate hegemonic effect of which is to in-
struct the savage to self-extinguish all troublesome expressions of
5. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
6. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
7. Id. at 2316-17.
8. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
9. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965.
10. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2321.
11. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1982). The official designation of the Act which created the ICRA is
Civil Rights-Riots-Fair Housing-Civil Obedience, Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 201-701, 82 Stat. 73,
77-81 (1968) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-41 (1982)). What is commonly called the Indian Civil
Rights Act is found in 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (1982). See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (containing pertinent




difference . .. from the white man's own hierarchic, universalized
worldview."12
Could such a statute be the savior of tribal sovereignty? We shall
see.
First, though, a point more grammatical than anything else. I will
be using throughout this paper two similar, but fundamentally different
terms: "non-Indian-reservation land," and "non-Indian reservation
land." The first term refers to land, owned by whomever, that does not
lie on an Indian reservation; the second refers to white-owned land
within the boundaries of a reservation. Hagen deals with
non-Indian-reservation land;1 3 Bourland with non-Indian reservation
land. 14
If you will accept these jurisprudentially significant hyphens, 15 my
position can be stated rather succinctly: Congress has the power
unilaterally to diminish the size of a reservation, thereby designating
surrounding areas as non-Indian-reservation land, most all of it owned
by whites. This power has been rarely exercised of .late, but was more
commonly used years ago, as Hagen shows.16 But, as the case also shows
by implication and as many other cases show directly, often Congress
has not diminished the size of a reservation down to the Indian-owned
lands, thereby leaving much non-Indian reservation land. To deny tribal
power over these lands, as Bourland did, is to reach the same result as
legislative diminishment, without congressional action. To augment
legislative diminishment with common-law diminishment is to derogate
congressional authority in the field. When Congress can do, and has
done (though rarely and not recently), by statute what the Court is
currently doing by edict, the Court has forgotten its constitutional
character. 17
With that introduction, I begin.
12. Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing
and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 219, 274 (1986).
13. 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
14. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
15. I am not always so enamored of the application of grammar to law, see Robert Laurence, A
Section-by-Section Chart Summarizing the Recent Changes in the Federal Bankruptcy Code, Affixed to
a Short Essay in Praise of the Sensibility of Judges and in Derogation of Small Roman Numerals,
Jurisprudentially Significant Hyphens and Title V of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,47 ARK. L.
REV. 857 (1994) (summarizing changes to the Bankruptcy Code).
16. See 114S. Ct. at 967.
17. In this regard, the present paper might be seen as a special case of Professor Ball's more
sweeping attack on modem Indian law jurisprudence, set forth in Milnar Ball, Constitution, Court,
Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. las. J. 1.
1995] 395
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REvIEw
II. LEGISLATIVE DIMINISHMENT: HAGEN V. UTAH AND ITS
PREDECESSORS
Hagen v. Utah,18 is the sixth Supreme Court case to ponder the
question whether an allotment-era statute, opening a reservation for white
settlement, worked a diminishment of the reservation down to the lands
allotted to the tribe and its members, or, on the other hand, left the
reservation boundary intact and merely allowed whites to homestead on
the reservation.19 Familiarity with the five cases preceding Hagen is
presumed.20 The following table collects some interesting information
about the prior cases and Hagen.
NAME PROCE- DISPSI- COURT VOTES BY




Seymour State habeas Supreme Unanimous None
corpus Court of not to remains
Washington diminish
reversed
Mattz State California Unanimous Rehnquist
forfeiture Court of not to votes not to
proceeding Appeal diminish diminish
reversed
18. 114 S. Ct. 958 (1994).
19. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958, 966 (1994) (ruling that the Surplus Land Act diminished the
reservation). During the allotment period, which comprised, roughly, the last three decades of the
19th century and the first three of the 20th, millions of acres of Indian land were opened for white
settlement. Much, but not all, of the rest of Indian country was allotted to individual Indians, with fee
title held in trust by the United States. For a good general discussion of the allotment period, see
CLNTON ET AL., AMICAN IuDIAN LAW 147-52 (3d ed. 1991).
20. The five cases, in reverse chronological order, are: Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984);
Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425
(1975) (consolidating two cases from below); Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481 (1973); Seymour v.
Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962). For a discussion of these cases see Tassie Hanna & Robert
Laurence, Justice Thurgood Marshall and the Problem of Indian Treaty Abrogation, 40 ARK. L. REV.
797 (1987) [hereinafter Hanna & Laurence, Treaty Abrogation], and Robert Laurence, Thurgood
Marshall's Indian Law Opinions, 27 How. L. REV. 3 (1984).
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DeCoteau State habeas South 6-3 to Rehnquist




DeCoteau Federal 8th Circuit 6-3 to Rehnquist
No. 73- habeas reversed diminish votes to
1500 corpus diminish
Rosebud Federal 8th Circuit 6-3 to Rehnquist
declaratory affirmed diminish and Stevens
judgement vote to
diminish
Bartlett Federal 8th Circuit Unanimous Rehnquist,




Hagen Direct Supreme 7-2 to Rehnquist,











Of the five cases, three were unanimous decisions finding no
diminishment 21 and two were divided decisions finding a
diminishment. 22 In Hagen, a divided court found the reservation
diminished, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor;. Justices Blackmun and
Souter dissented.23
21. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 481; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 506; Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356.
22. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 615.
23. Hagen v. Utah, 114 S. Ct. 958,968 (1994).
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When Tassie Hanna and I wrote about reservation diminishment
following the fifth case, Solem v. Bartlett, we observed that:
The handiest way to explain the diminishment quintet is to
say that, first, the language of the abrogating statute controls.
That factor alone is enough to explain four of the cases. [The
statute in] DeCoteau used the word "cede" and the reservation
was diminished; [those in] Seymour, Mattz, and Bartlett did not
and the reservation remained intact. Agreement and a sum-
certain payout are not requirements for a diminishment, but, in
combination with clear language, ensure it. The other factors
mentioned by Justice Marshall in his review of the law are
likely to be too equivocal to overcome the wording of the
statute. Only in Rosebud did these other factors play a decisive
role and then only with respect to the later statutes. The 1904
act used the word "cede" and carried along with it the 1907
and 1910 acts, which did not.24
The Solicitor General reached a similar conclusion about the state
of the law after Bartlett,2 5 and he argued in Hagen that a
"clear-statement rule" had been established by the prior cases,
''pursuant to which a finding of diminishment would require both
explicit language of cession or other language evidencing the surrender
of tribal interests and an unconditional commitment from Congress to
compensate the Indians."26 The majority of the Court disagreed, and
Justice O'Connor wrote: "Although the statutory language must
'establis[h] an express congressional purpose to diminish,' [citing
Bartlett], we have never required any particular form of words before
finding diminishment." 27 This statement is technically true; DeCoteau
and Rosebud found diminishments without requiring that any particular
word appear in the abrogating statute. 28 Nevertheless, the Solicitor
General was right and, at the very least, Ms. Hanna and I could be
forgiven for thinking that there was a Supreme Court requirement,
however stated, that the abrogating statute contain language of cession.
24. Hanna & Laurence, Treaty Abrogation, supra note 20, at 815-16.
25. While Ms. Hanna and I shortened the name of the case to "Bartlett," the Court in Hagen calls
it "Solem." Whichever choice I make in this paper will lead to some confusion; I will stick with
"Bartlett" for the same reason we chose it originally: Solem, as the warden of the South Dakota
penitentiary, is more likely to have his name repeated in the style of other habeas corpus cases, while
Bartlett is not.
26. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965.
27. Id. (citation omitted).
28. DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 449; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 615.
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Hagen focused on the language "restored to the public domain,"
found in the initial 1902 Act that attempted to open the reservation of
the Utes to white settlement. 29  "Cede," the word sought, if not
"required" by several of the pre-Hagen cases, is a more definitive word
than "restored to the public domain," showing that the tribes were, in
fact, giving up sovereign authority, voluntarily or not, over their lands,
and there was a certain sense to "requiring" it. Justice Blackmun
dissented in Hagen on that ground, among others. 30 However, the
Hagen Court's focus on "restored to the public domain" was still and
all a focus on statutory language and, thus, fit under the Solicitor
General's "clear-statement rule." In fact, the 1902 Act fairly clearly
had reservation diminishment in mind, as the Act contemplated both the
tribes' agreement to the change and a payment of a sum certain, per
acre, for the land, 3 1 circumstances important to the finding of
diminishment in the prior cases.32
The problem is that this Act was premised on Indian consent,
consent that was never obtained. 33 The 1903 and 1905 Acts and
President Theodore Roosevelt's proclamation of 1905 did away with the
requirement of consent, 34 but their language was not so clear as the 1902
Act's, containing conflicting references, on the one hand, to "restored to
the public domain," 35 and on the other hand to "opening lands for
settlement and entry." 36 The latter language is similar in import to
29. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961-62,967 (discussing the Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888,32 Stat. 263).
30. Id. at 971. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun stated:
[T]he only two cases in which this Court previously has found diminishment involved
statutes and underlying tribal agreements to "cede, sell, relinquish, and convey to the
United States all [the Indians'] claim, right, title, and interest" in the unallotted lands or to
"cede, surrender, grant, and convey to the United States all [the Indians'] claim, right,
title, and interest" in a defined portion of the reservation. The Court held that in the
presence of statutory language "precisely suited" to diminishment, supported by the
express consent of the tribes, "the intent of all parties to effect a clear conveyance of all
unallotted lands was evident."
I need hardly add that no such language or underlying Indian consent accompanies the statute at issue
in this case. Id. at 973 (brackets in original) (citations omitted).
31. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961-62.
32. See, eg., DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 448.
33. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 961.
34. Id. at 962-64 (discussing the Act of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 998 (directing the
Secretary of the Interior to open the Uintah reservation, even without the Indians' consent, by October
1, 1904); the Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat. 207 (deferring the opening date tinil March 10,
1905); the Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1069 (deferring the opening date until September
1, 1905, or earlier by Presidential Proclamation); and the Proclamation of July 14, 1905; 34 Stat.
3119-20 (President Theodore Roosevelt) (opening the land for white settlement on August 28, 1905)).
35. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 963 (quoting the Presidential Proclamation of July 14, 1905, 34 Stat.
3119-20 (quoting the Act of May 27, 1902 which used the language "shall be restored to the public
domain.")).
36. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 962-63, nn.3-5 (providing the text of the Acts of March 3, 1903, April
21, 1904, and March 3, 1905, which contain repeated references to the "opening" of the land).
1995] 399
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language held in the prior cases not to diminish the reservation; merely
opening a reservation for white settlement leads to the creation of
non-Indian reservation land.37 Hagen focused on "restored to the
public land," in holding that the series of acts and proclamations created
non-Indian-reservation land.
In this sense Hagen is the child of Rosebud, an opinion written by
then-Justice Rehnquist in 1977 which found diminishment in a most
creative way. In both Hagen and Rosebud, the consent of the Indians to
the opening of the reservation was first sought, but the reservation was
opened without an agreement ever being consummated.3 8 In both cases,
there was arguably diminishment language in the early statutes, bills, and
agreements construed, but not in later ones. 39 And in both cases, Lone
Wolf v. Hitchcock40 played a key role. That case, of course, held that
Congress did not need the consent of the Indians to abrogate a treaty, at
least to the extent that the Court refused to enjoin, on due process
grounds, Interior Secretary Hitchcock from enforcing an abrogating
statute. 4 1 In both Hagen and Rosebud, the Court used the Lone Wolf
37. In Seymour, the Court wrote:
[I]t seems clear that the purpose of the 1906 Act was neither to destroy the existence of
the [southern half of the] Colville Indian Reservation nor to lessen federal responsibility
for and jurisdiction over the Indians having tribal rights on that reservation. The [1906]
Act did no more than open the way for non-Indian settlers to own land on the reservation
in a manner which the Federal Government, acting as guardian and trustee for the
Indians, regarded as beneficial to the development of its wards.
Seymour, 368 U.S. at 356. And this, from Rosebud: "The mere fact that a reservation has been
opened to settlement does not necessarily mean that the opened area has lost its reservation status."
Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 586-87, quoted in Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 973 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
38. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 962-63 (discussing the effect of the Act of March 27, 1902, which
contemplated the Indians' consent and the Act of March 3, 1903, which opened the reservation without
consent); Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 587-88 (regarding an agreement between the United States and the
Indians which, if ratified, would have diminished the reservation, but which was never ratified).
39. See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing Hagen); Rosebud, 430 U.S. at
595-61 (discussing the differences between the Act of April 23, 1904 (using language of cession), and
the Acts of May 30, 1910, and March 2, 1907 (using no language of cession)).
40. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
41. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903). In United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
371,410-15 (1980), the Court stopped just short of overruling Lone Wolf, holding instead that, while the
United States had the power to abrogate an Indian treaty unilaterally, it was potentially liable in the
Court of Claims for doing so. Lone Wolf had appeared to go much farther, threatening to make all
abrogations non-judiciable political questions, even in the face of proof of congressional bad faith.
Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568. One of the unfortunate things about Rosebud and Hagen is that they
breathe life back into the long-discredited Lone Wolf, a case that sounds rather ruthless to a modern
reader. I concede, however, the rationality of the Court's method of statutory construction, as it is not
beyond conjecture that Congress's method of doing business might have changed after Lone Wolf.
Note, however, that the statute in Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 481, was enacted after Lone Wolf and the
unanimous Court did not find it to abrogate the treaty and diminish the reservation.
400
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decision to explain away Congress's failure to obtain consent and the
dropping of any cession language from post-1903 enactments.42
So, the kernel of Hagen appears only to be a refinement, not a
rejection, of the Solicitor General's "clear-statement rule." 43 "Cede"
is clearly diminishment language, but "restore to the public domain" is
only marginally less clear, and note incidentally that Justice O'Connor
gave special emphasis to the word "restore."44 True, the Hagen opinion
resurrected the factors beyond the clear-statement rule, to wit, the
contemporaneous events surrounding passage of the homesteading acts,
the subsequent jurisdictional history, and the present demography of the
opened areas. 45 These factors had appeared to suffer the Court's
misgivings, but not rejection, in Bartlett.46 Justice O'Connor turned
briefly to discuss contemporary historical evidence, subsequent history
and present demographics, finding all of these factors consistent with her
reading of the abrogating statutes and declarations. 47 But then, Justice
Marshall for the unanimous Court in Bartlett had given the same sort of
glance at these factors,48 even while emphasizing the importance of the
language of the abrogating statute.49 So, here again, Hagen did not
break much new ground.50
42. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 968; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 594.
43. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 968.
44. Id. at 966. It is, of course, true that in many cases the land in question will never have been
part of the "public domain" in the first place, but rather will have been aboriginal land held by the
tribes roughly since the Bering Strait froze over. In such a case, the abrogating statute would place
the land for the first time in the public domain. In Hagen, the reservation was created, not by treaty,
but by executive order, out of land which was already in the public domain. Id. at 961. Whether the
Hagen case is extendable to treaty reservations is unclear. Note that in the cases prior to Hagen, two
involved executive order reservations, see Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354; Mattz, 412 U.S. at 490 n.9, two
involved treaty reservations, see DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 431; Rosebud, 430 U.S. at 589, and one a
statutory reservation, see Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 465.
45. See Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 968-70.
46. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 475-80.
47. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 968-70. The Court made special reference and attached special
relevance to a discussion of the matter of reservation diminishment at meetings between the United
States and the Utes held from May 18 to May 23, 1903. Id. at 968. Given the importance of
communication directly between the executive branch and the Indians, ponder the considerable
incongruity contained in the present Supreme Court's denial of the tribe's request to participate in the
Hagen case. See Hagen v. Utah, 113 S. Ct. 2438 (1993) (denying the motion of the Ute Indian Tribe
for leave to intervene). In Hagen, Justice Blackmun found the factors, especially the contemporary
historical evidence, ambiguous at best, as often is and will continue to be the case. 114 S. Ct. at 975
(Blackmun. J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated:
"Although the Court relies on the negotiation history of the 1902 Act and that of the Act
of Mar. 3, 1903 to support its conclusion, nothing in the negotiations with the Ute Indian
Tribe 'unequivocally reveal~s] a widely held, contemporaneous understanding' that the
Uintah Reservation boundaries would be diminished."
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 471).
48. Bartlett, 465 U.S. at 479-80.
49. Id. at 475.
50. There is one place at which Hagen threatens an unfortunate shift in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, and that is at the point where Justice O'Connor too easily compared Indian reservations
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"In the end," Tassie Hanna and I observed after Bartlett: "Justice
Marshall was left with the foundation of reluctance, undisturbed by
equivocal evidence of what Congress said, what it meant and what it was
thought to have meant later."5 l It is the variable solidity of this
foundation of reluctance that seems to be the principal difference
between Bartlett and Hagen. While Justice O'Connor mentioned the
historical reluctance with which allegations of diminishment have been
met, something is missing; the Court somehow doesn't feel very
reluctant. Buried in a long paragraph outlining the Court's approach to
diminishment questions is the observation that "[t]hroughout the
inquiry, we resolve any ambiguities in favor of the Indians, and we will
not lightly find diminishment." 52  For that proposition, Justice
O'Connor cited two cases which did not themselves show much in the
way of reluctance to cut back on tribal authority.53 The Court did not
express any general or particular reluctance again.54
What could explain this deterioration in the reluctance with which
the Court approaches diminishment cases? For one thing, there has been
a major makeover of the Court since Bartlett; five Justices have joined
the Court, four of whom voted to diminish the Utes' reservation. 55
Perhaps we are seeing a shift away from reluctance to diminish. On the
to bird sanctuaries and military bases:
This power of reservation was exercised for various purposes, including Indian settlement, bird
preservation, and military installations. "when it appeared that the public interest would be served by
withdrawing or reserving parts of the public domain." It follows that when lands so reserved were
"restored" to the public domain- i.e. once again opened to sale or settlement-their previous use was
extinguished.
Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 966 (citations omitted). This quotation does not stand up to careful
inspection. Many, if not most, Indian lands were not open for sale or settlement in the first place, as
the Court recognized that the possessory rights of Indians were subject to divestment only by the
federal government, if at all, and could not be subject to divestment by individual land purchasers.
See, eg., Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543,603-05 (1823).
51. Hanna & Laurence, Treaty Abrogation, supra note 10, at 815.
52. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 965. Justice Blackmun responded:
Although the majority purports to apply these canons in principle.... it ignores them in
practice, resolving every ambiguity in the statutory language, legislative history, and
surrounding circumstances in favor of the State and imputing to Congress, where no
clear evidence of congressional intent exists, an intent to diminish the Uintah Valley
Reservation.
Id. at 972 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
53. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes
and Bands of the Yakima Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (holding that a county could impose an ad
valorem tax on non-Indian reservation land).
54. Cf. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 971 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). '"Great nations, like great men,
should keep their word,' and we do not lightly find that Congress has broken its solemn promises to
Indian tribes." Id. (quoting F.P.C. v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1959) (Black, J.,
dissenting)). Justice Blackmun's reluctance to abrogate is felt throughout the dissent.
55. See table in Part H (providing a graphic depiction of the structure of the Court and the
justices voting for diminishment).
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other hand, three Justices voted against diminishment in Bartlett and for
diminishment in Hagen, suggesting that, at least for these three, the shift
is based on principle, not personnel. 56
It is possible that the reluctance that the Court feels toward the
diminishment of the reservation relates to one of the factors that Justice
O'Connor's opinion in Hagen pulled back into the analysis: the present
demographics of the area at issue. Note that it is, and always has been,
something of a stretch to relate the present demography of the land to
the question of whether Congress in the early part of this century
intended, with an inartfully written statute, to turn non-Indian reservation
property into non-Indian-reservation property.57 It is easier for me to
relate demography to judicial reluctance, or not, than to congressional
intent.
I am suggesting that there is one way to read Bartlett and Hagen
together. When the Court looked at the lands in question inBartlett and
found them inhabited mostly by Indians, it was reluctant to find
legislative diminishment- under an early statute. But, when the Court
found the lands inhabited mostly by whites, in Hagen, its reluctance to
diminish was not heartfelt and was directed elsewhere; it was now quietly
reluctant to find that tribal jurisdiction extended over these non-Indians,
in the face of a federal homesteading statute. As Justice O'Connor
thought relevant to note, in Bartlett the seat of the tribe's government
was on the opened land, whereas in Hagen the largest city in the opened
area was 93% white.58
As theoretically irrelevant (or at least "unorthodox and potentially
unreliable," in the Bartlett Court's words) as present demography is to
the interpretation of early statutes, it seems realistically to be a factor that
plays a role in the Court's analysis, most obviously in the ebb and flow
of reluctance to diminish the reservation. Similar forces were at work in
56. See table in Part 11. Blackmun, the ninth Justice, voted against diminishment in both cases.
57. The Court in Bartlett called this demographic factor "unorthodox and potentially unreliable."
465 U.S. at 472 n.13. One might have expected Justice Scalia, the leader of the Court when it comes
to the restructuring of the rules of statutory construction, to have objected to the introduction of 1994
demography into the calculus of interpretation for a 1902 statute. Cf. MCI Telecommunications Corp.
v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 114 S. Ct. 2223 (1994) (interpreting the meaning of the word "modify"
in § 203 of the Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), codified at 47 U.S.C. § 203(a)). In
particular, the issue was whether Congress' use of the word granted the Federal Communications
Commission the authority to make large, or only small, changes in the statutory requirements. Id. at
2228. The Court held the latter, after lengthy and careful parsing of conflicting dictionary definitions
of the word. Id. at 2229-31. The three dissenting Justices thought that a Senate report was relevant to
the inquiry. Id. at 2233-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting S. Rep. No. 781, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1934)). Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, cited no legislative history and thought it more
relevant to discuss various critical reviews of particular dictionaries that contained what the critics.
and the Court, considered to be non-standard definitions of the word "modify." Id. at 2230 n.3.
58. Hagen, 114 S. Ct. at 970.
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South Dakota v. Bourland, with respect to what I call "judicial
diminishment," to which I now turn my attention.
III. JUDICIAL DIMINISHMENT: SOUTH DAKOTA V. BOURLAND
AND ITS PREDECESSORS
South Dakota v. Bourland59 involves non-Indian reservation land,
to wit, the Oahe Reservoir, which lies within the boundary of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation. 60 That reservation was held, in
Bartlett, not to have been diminished by the 1908 homesteading act,
which opened the land for white settlement, but, the Court held, left the
reservation boundary intact. 61 At an earlier stage of the Bourland
litigation, the State of South Dakota had tried again, this time arguing
that the reservation had been diminished in the Hagen sense by the
Cheyenne River Act of 1954.62 The District Court held against the State
on that issue, 63 and that determination was not appealed.64 In the
Supreme Court's opinion, it appears settled that the Cheyenne River
Sioux Reservation was never diminished by Congress, either in 1908 or
in 1954: "Like this case, Montana [v. United States], concerned an
Indian tribe's power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing on
lands located within a reservation but no longer owned by the tribe or
its members."65 But, in denying tribal authority over those lands, the
Court reached a result virtually indistinguishable from Hagen-style
reservation diminishment by legislative fiat. That is to say, the treatment
given by Bourland to tribal power over non-Indian reservation lands all
but converts them into non-Indian-reservation lands, without the benefit
of a congressional statute diminishing the reservation.
Often the most telling part of the Court's opinion in Indian law
cases is the initial sentence of the analysis. Here is Justice Thomas's
from Bourland: "Congress has the power to abrogate Indians' treaty
rights, though we usually insist that Congress clearly express its intent to
do so."66 Beginning the sentence with the power to abrogate, modifying
the word "insist," and even joining the two thoughts with the casual
59. 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
60. South Dakota v. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. 2309 (1993).
61. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
62. See Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2313-14 & n.2 (citation omitted) (describing the conveyance of
land by the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe).
63. See id. at 2314.
64. See id. at 2321 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316 (emphasis added) (discussing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S.
544 (1981)).
.66. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2315-16 (citations omitted).
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"though," sets the tone for the opinion; this is one of those cases where
tribal sovereignty will not be advanced with any enthusiasm, if at all.
In addition to the discouraging start of the Court's opinion, there is
a certain sourness throughout it. Especially in responding to the dissent,
the Court exhibits a surliness that I find distasteful (a surliness,
incidentally, totally absent from Hagen, even in the face of a sharp
opinion by the same two dissenters). 67 For instance, the Court wrote:
The dissent apparently finds ambiguity in [Section 2 of the
Flood Control .Act of 1944], on the grounds that it "does not
address the question of which rights Congress intended to
take." The self-evident answer is that. when Congress used the
term "all claims, rights and demands" of the Tribe, it meant
all claims, rights and demands. 68
This is a clever, if sarcastic, turn of phrase, but note the sentence to
which it is subtended: "This provision reliably indicates that the
Government and the Tribe understood the Act to embody the full terms
of their Agreement, including the various rights that the Tribe and its
members would continue to enjoy after conveying the 104,420 acres to
the Government." 69
Thus, the Court's marginal sarcasm is misplaced, as the Tribe did
retain rights under the very statute that the Court uses to make the
"self-evident" and collegiality-disrupting point that the taking of all
rights means the taking of all rights. One would think it equally
self-evident, and more apropos, that the taking of fewer than all rights,
leaves some untaken.
The Bourland opinion goes beyond surliness and becomes
damaging to the body of Indian law in the Court's footnote 15:
The dissent's complaint that we give "barely a nod" to the Tribe's
inherent sovereignty argument is simply another manifestation of its
disagreement with Montana, which announced "the general proposition
that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to
the activities of the nonmembers of the tribe." While the dissent refers
to our "myopic focus" on the Tribe's prior treaty right to "absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation" of the taken area, it shuts both
eyes to the reality that after Montana, tribal sovereignty over
67. I hesitate to attribute this surliness to Justice Thomas, himself, as he secured the votes of six
colleagues for the opinion as published, and avoided any concurrences on the grounds of
non-judicious temperament or otherwise.
68. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2317 n.10 (citation omitted).
69. Id. (emphasis added).
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nonmembers "cannot survive without express congressional
delegation," and therefore is not inherent. 70
This is a too-eager destruction of the civil-side application of
inherent tribal sovereignty, and the Court knows it. The very next
paragraph of the opinion in the text following this footnote concedes
that tribal power over non-members remains inherent even under
Montana in at least two circumstances: (1) the inherent ability, without
congressional approval, to "regulate activities of nonmembers who enter
.consensual relationships' with the tribe or its members"71 and (2) the
inherent ability to exercise civil authority, without congressional
approval, over the conduct of non-members "'when that conduct
threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' 72 These are
sweeping and important exceptions found in Montana, and, Bourland's
footnote 15 to the contrary notwithstanding, they remain good and
active law. As the Court properly noted, these possible exercises of
inherent civil authority were "[left] to be resolved on remand."73
Thus, it is hard to know whether Bourland extends Montana or not.
Footnote 15 would seem to, but the text following the footnote would
not. I believe I will rely on the text over the footnote, which seems
entirely fair, until the Court requires otherwise.
Bourland's footnote 15 is sure to be cited to lower courts, and more
dangerously, by lower courts for the proposition that there is no inherent
civil-side tribal authority over non-Indians. Meanwhile, the Court's
nearby acknowledgment in Bourland's text that there is, in fact, inherent
civil-side tribal authority over non-Indians may go by the wayside. 74
For those who care about tribal sovereignty, the risk that the footnote will
come to control the text is too great for the mere chance to take a
literary swipe at the dissenters, if that is what Justice Thomas was doing.
70. Id. at 2320 n.15 (citations omitted).
71. Id. at 2320 (quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 565).
72. Id.
73. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320.
74. In the recent case of United States ex rel Morongo Board of Mission Indians v. Rose, 34 F.3d
901 (9th Cir. 1994), the court cited Bourlands footnote 15 for what it perceived as a "narrow view,"
id. at 906 n.3, of inherent tribal sovereignty, even while finding that the tribe had inherent authority,
under both Montana and Bourland, to regulate the activity of the defendant in that bingo-related case.
The emphasis I fear on Bourland's footnote rather than the text is found in one awfully
enthusiastic discussion of the case. See Timothy R. Malone & Bradley B. Furber, Civil Jurisdiction of
Indian Tribes over Nonmembers: The Supreme Court Sheds New Light on an Old Problem, 8 NAT.
REsouRcE & ENVT 83,85-86 (1993).
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Even for those who don't care about tribal sovereignty, it would seem
both injudicious and petty.75
Even if Bourland does not extend the reach of Montana, it does
continue the Court's trend of restricting the ability of tribes to exercise
jurisdiction over non-Indian reservation land. Let us parse the holding
of the Court carefully: "Montana and Brendale establish that when an
Indian tribe conveys ownership of its tribal lands to non-Indians, it loses
any former right of absolute and exclusive use and occupation of the
conveyed lands." 76 This is a truism, qualified only by the observation
that, ever since Johnson v. M'Intosh,77 a tribe is able to convey
ownership only to the United States. Continue: "The abrogation of this
greater right, at least in the context of the type of area at issue in this
case, implies the loss of regulatory jurisdiction over the use of the land
by others." 78 A footnote follows the word "case," in which the Court
limited its holding to those parts of the reservation "broadly opened to
the public."79 There is likely to be much litigation over the meaning of
these words; for example, does the granting or taking of an easement
across a reservation for an interstate highway "broadly open" a
reservation? Just the roadway? Some land on either side? The entire
reservation? If a tribe loses all power over reservation lands to which
75. There is another point, not precisely germane to the present topic, where Bourland is
seriously damaging to careful Indian law analysis. This involves the question of the abrogation of
Indian treaties by federal statutes apparently inconsistent with the treaty, when the statutes do not
expressly show an intent to abrogate. Until Bourland, United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734 (1986), set a
very strict test for these so-called "quiet" abrogations: "What is essential is clear evidence that
Congress actually considered the conflict between its intended action on the one hand and Indian
treaty rights on the other, and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty." Id. at 739-40.
"Essential," "actually," and "chose" are three strong words in the Dion test, and, if nothing else,
showed that in circumstances where the statute is not expressly abrogatory, careful consideration by a
court is necessary before finding the intent to abrogate. Bourland applied Dion in one seven-sentence
paragraph. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2319. The first five sentences state the Dion case, including the
test, quoted just above. Next comes a one-sentence application of Dion to the Bourland facts,
followed by a sweeping conclusion: "When Congress reserves limited rights to a tribe or its members,
the very presence of such a limited reservation of rights suggests that the Indians would otherwise be
treated like the public at large." Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2319. If such a "suggestion" is to be shown,
either in this particular case or in general, it would take more than a short-shrift, one-sentence analysis
to show it. And even if such a "suggestion" were shown, it turns Dion on its head to equate a mere
"suggestion" with actual congressional consideration and choice.
In any event, Bourland does not seem to implicate Dion at all. In Dion the Court had found only
after careful consideration that the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 668, which was entirely
silent regarding Indian treaties, abrogated the Yankton Sioux's treaty rights to hunt on their reservation.
In Bourland, the statutes at issue were clearly treaty-abrogating ones and the question was which
treaty rights survived the abrogation of some. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. The
next time a Dion-type "quiet" abrogation is present, advocates for the tribes should be able to
convince the Court, if ever one-sentence analysis is appropriate, it is not under Dion's "actual
consideration and choice" test.
76. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316.
77. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
78. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2316.
79. Id. n.9.
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non-members have motorized access, a tribe's reluctance to allow such
access would be understandable. Congress, of course, could always take
the land unilaterally and the tribe be damned, but one hopes that such
eras in white-Indian relations are long past. One perhaps unintended
result of Bourland is to drive tribes to increasing defensiveness and
insularity. Continue:
In taking tribal trust lands and other reservation lands for the
Oahe Dam and Reservoir Project, and broadly opening up
those lands for public use, Congress, through the Flood Control
and Cheyenne River Acts eliminated the Tribe's power to
exclude non-Indians from these lands, and with that the
incidental regulatory jurisdiction formerly enjoyed by the
Tribe .80
The Court itself had rejected this overly facile tie-in between the
power to exclude and the power to regulate, at least in the context of the
power to tax, in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe,81 and, in fact, Justice
Stevens dissented in Merrion on just these grounds.8 2 Of course, in
Merrion the tribe had itself opened its reservation to the non-Indians by
contract, while in Bourland the opening had been done by Congress, but
therein lies just exactly the point: The Court seems to have lost sight of
the distinction between the opening of a reservation that we see at work
in Hagen and the opening of a reservation that we see in Bourland. It is
to that distinction that I now turn.
IV. THE FUNDAMENTAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND OWNERSHIP
We have then, in Hagen, a congressional statute, or series of statutes,
that was held to have taken land from the Ute tribe, restored said land to
the public domain, and reduced the size of the reservation to include
only the land owned by Indians.8 3 And we have, in Bourland, a
congressional statute that took the land from the tribe, opened it up for
recreational use by whites, but left the land within the existing
boundaries of the reservation. 8 4  If Hagen makes any sense, the
80. Id. at 2316-17.
81. 455 U.S. 130 (1982). In Merrion, the Court found that the Tribe retained the inherent right to
impose taxes in mining activities on the reservation "as part of its power to govern and to pay for the
costs of self-government." Id.
82. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 185 (1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See supra notes 18-57 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 58-80 and accompanying text.
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difference between these two statutes should be important, else why
spend so much time determining whether the statute "restored the
property to the public domain" or merely "opened the reservation for
white settlement"?
But note how similar the Hagen and Bourland results are, for in
both cases, the tribes lost regulatory control over the lands in question.
In Hagen, the Court concluded that Congress intended for the
reservation to shrink in size to include only Indian-owned land, but in
Bourland, having concluded that Congress did not intend that result, the
Court nevertheless denied tribal regulatory jurisdiction over the land.
And note, too, the actual results in the two cases. Because the Ute
reservation was diminished by statute, state jurisdiction attached to the
land and Mr. Hagen stayed in state prison for the crime he committed in
Myton, Utah. Federal jurisdiction in Myton 'is no greater than it is in Salt
Lake City; this is non-Indian-reservation land. On the other hand, the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation was not diminished by statute, so the
usual barriers to state power arose.8 5  Tribal jurisdiction over the
"broadly opened" areas was removed by Bourland, leaving the federal
government as the only government with jurisdiction.8 6 On what basis
does this difference make sense?
Thus has the Court apparently adopted the view of the Businessman
in The Little Prince.8 7 In Bourland, the tribe may "reign over" the land
in question, at least to the extent that the land is still part of its
reservation, but that sovereignty becomes less important than the harsh
reality of who "owns" the land. 88 But then, why the Hagen fuss, and
what about Bartlett, Mattz, and Seymour?
As much as many of us abhor the allotment period, 89 and the
diminishment statutes that were a part of allotment, the Court's theory in
the Seymour-Hagen line of cases makes logical sense, once one is
convinced that in some cases Congress intended to reduce the size of the
reservation. But it is the logical sense of this line of statutory cases that
shows the weakness of the Oliphant-Montana-Bourland line of common
85. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959) (ruling that the state court had no jurisdiction over
a non-Indian doing business on a reservation seeking relief for unpaid goods sold on credit);
McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973) (ruling that the state had no
jurisdiction to impose a tax on the income of Indians residing on the reservation whose income is
wholly derived from reservation sources); County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the
Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992) (finding that the Indian General Allotment Act permitted a
county to impose an ad valorem tax on reservation land patented in fee but it did not allow a county to
enforce excise tax on sales of such land).
86. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
87. See supra note **
88. Bourland, 113 S. Ct. at 2320-21.
89. See GErcHas Er AL., FEDERAL INDWAN LAW 168-214 (3d ed. 1993).
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law cases. Given that Congress can directly reach the Bourland result by
reservation diminishment if it chooses to, and that, in the case of the
Cheyenne River Sioux reservation, it chose not to, what justifies the
Court's diminishing of the reservation by judicial edict under the
common law? Nothing, but the no-nonsense assessment of the
Businessman: "Kings do not own, they reign over. It is a very different
matter ."90
In Bourland, the Court took the same no-nonsense approach,
reducing, with a glibness approaching the Businessman's, the tribe's
status as a government to irrelevancy. We know that the Oahe Reservoir
is on-reservation, but the reservation government has no regulatory
power over the land and water. It is true, of course, that many tribal
leaders and others would agree with the Businessman about the practical
economic and social effects of land ownership on those reservations
where much land is held by non-Indians. But every government must
face this potential conflict between sovereign and private interests, and,
even given the practical importance of land ownership, no government
willingly surrenders sovereign regulatory power over land just because it
is owned by non-citizens.
V. THE IRONIC ROLE OF THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Thus, Bourland is wrong not only because it is inconsistent with the
Hagen analysis and thereby destructive of congressional prerogative, but
also because it ignores the important difference between ownership and
sovereignty. And why is the Court attracted to the Businessman's
pragmatic philosophy, especially when it entails the pre-emption of an
independent and more logical alternative theory, that of legislative
reservation diminishment? I believe it is at this point that Hagen and
Bourland fold in together, and I return to a point made above.
Recall that the most obvious difference, I thought, between Bartlett
and Hagen was the change in the Court's apparent reluctance to find
congressional diminishment of the reservation. And, I thought, the best
way to explain this variable reluctance was by observing the Court's
variable interest in present-day demographics of the land at issue. When
the land concerned is mostly held by Indians, as in Bartlett, the Court
was reluctant to find diminishment, but not when the land was mostly
non-Indian, as in Hagen. Likewise, in Bourland, the Court was reluctant
90. DE SAwNr-Exupt.y, supra note **, at 45.
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to allow tribal jurisdiction to extend to non-Indian lands, even when they
clearly are on-reservation lands.
Thus, both cases dealt, in different procedural postures and against
fundamentally different statutory backgrounds, with the question that
permeates all of federal Indian law: to what extent will Indian tribes be
allowed to exercise power over non-Indians and, more broadly, to what
extent are Indian tribes governments? Ever since Oliphant, at least in the
modem era, the Court has become increasingly frank in its misgivings
about allowing tribes to exercise power over non-Indians and their lands.
These misgivings become manifest when one considers Hagen's
attention to the logically problematic present-day demographics and
Bourland's subtle pre-emption of the Hagen diminishment analysis.
There is at least a modicum of sense to these misgivings. Modem
federal Indian law is driven by the notions of self-determination and
difference. Unless and until all reservations are diminished in the Hagen
sense, self-determination for tribes will implicate the rights of
non-citizens, as is the case for all governments. And, as long as Indian
law is about difference and not sameness, those non-citizens will be
treated differently from the way they are at home. It is true, of course,
that when an American visits or resides in Malaysia, for instance, the
rules are different from those at home, but it is also true, and has been at
least since Cherokee Nation v. Georgia ,91 that the visit to or stay on an
Indian reservation will not be treated under our domestic law as if it were
a visit to Malaysia.
It is not necessary, in my view, for one to ignore the fact that things
are done differently on Indian reservations. In fact, the vibrancy of the
field is premised on the necessity that one not ignore those differences.
Furthermore, it is too much to expect those on either side of the border
to be easily persuaded that those different ways are preferable to the way
things are done at home. Only those of the New Age ilk become
immediately converted to Indian ways merely on having them explained.
And vice versa, as Chief Justice Robert Yazzie of the Navajo Supreme
Court wrote to me recently: "Navajos are notorious for taking that from
the dominant society which we find useful and rejecting the rest." 92
And finally, in my view, it is not necessary for either the dominant or
tribal society to act as though those differences were not important.
Modem American Indian law requires that the intersection between
dominant-society law and tribal law be very carefully tended.
91. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
92. Letter to the author from Robert Yazzie. Chief Justice of the Navaho Supreme Court, used
here with his permission.
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As should be clear by now, I prefer Hagen to Bourland, but neither
case carefully tends that intersection. Both cases diminished the
reservations involved, removing most applications of tribal law to
non-members and therefore most questions of the difference between
off- and on-reservation rules. In an entirely different context, Justice
Cardozo said, "Spoliation is not management," 93 and the same thought
applies here. The relationship between Indian and non-Indian law needs
management, not the destruction of the tribal regulatory regime.
It is likely that the Court did not undertake that careful management
because no common law or statutory rules apply to federal court
inspection of tribal civil process, save the Hagen and Bourland lines
which altogether destroy tribal authority. The Indian Civil Rights Act,
which would allow a federal court to traffic, not in the destruction of
tribal law, but in its modification, lost all, or most, civil-side application in
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.94 It is for this reason that I make the
controversial observation that, if the ICRA were still in the hands of
federal judges to be used to inspect tribal process for what might be
called "ICRA fairness," the Court might lose the reluctance that we saw
in both Hagen and Bourland to allow any application of tribal civil law
to non-Indians.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two qualifications to the conclusion that an effective
civil-side ICRA would lessen the Supreme Court's reluctance to permit
tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians. First, it didn't work in
Oliphant. The presence of habeas corpus and criminal-side ICRA
collateral attack did not keep the Court from denying tribal criminal
jurisdiction over Mark Oliphant, and with him, all non-Indians.
Second, I'm not at all sure that what I propose is what the tribes
want. The restoration of tribal power over non-Indians is something that
will probably be more important to some tribes than to others. And even
to those tribes for whom such restoration is important, the ICRA's
price-oversight of tribal decision-making by federal judges-may be
too dear. Recall Professor Robert Williams' description: "a highly
efficient process of legal auto-genocide."
I respond as follows: First, I grant that the ICRA did not keep
Oliphant from happening; I'm not certain a renewed ICRA will stop
Bourland in its tracks, either. But nothing else seems to be working.
93. Shoshone Tribe v. United States. 299 U.S. 476,498 (1936).
94. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
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Since 1978, when both Martinez and Oliphant were decided, when the
ICRA was removed from the civil side, and when criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians was denied, the tribes have had increasingly unfettered
power to do less and less. One supposes that eventually the tribes will
have entirely unfettered power to do essentially nothing. These trends
must be stopped or the tribes renamed as Indian clubs or tribal
corporations.
Second, I defer to tribal judgments. It seems to me-a non-Indian
on a college campus-that the final fight for a doctrine recognizable as
tribal sovereignty will be over civil regulatory and adjudicatory
jurisdiction over non-Indians. If that's not a realistic view, and if the
fight is really over bingo parlors and waste dumps, religious freedom
and U.N. recognition; if it's more important to hold the ICRA at bay,
even at the cost of civil power over non-Indians, then so be it. It seems
otherwise to me, but we should all listen to those closest to the question,
those who live, work and exercise jurisdiction, or not, on and near the
reservation.
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